The general aim of these workshops was to explore the “specific nature of the integration process”  by analysing the strategies adopted by the authorities, those adopted by migrants of Turkish origin, and the successes and failures of the various participants in this process. We might as well be honest: the integration statistics for Turks living in these three European countries are pretty dire: academic failure, language problems, endogamic marriage and nationalistic points of view directed at the country of origin abound. Anyone working with this social-economic data would undoubtedly come to the same sad conclusion, but I was particularly interested to know the reasons for such a failure, and the solutions proposed by specialist researchers in the field. 

 

 

Three countries, five models 

 

At the beginning of the day, Professor Ferhat Kentel of the Bilgi University of Istanbul began by discussing the three rather contradictory models of integration used in France, Germany and Belgium.

"Integration in France is looked at as a construction of citizenship viewed as an achievement (an ideal to be achieved). In this system, a Turk can become French if he follows the process of integration, and as long as it fits in with the dominant model his origins are of little importance. Turks in France are thus in the midst of a constant process of negotiation between two powerful national identities: those of France and Turkey. On the other hand, being German isn’t simply to behave like a German, being German takes into account the origin, culture and mindset of the candidate citizen, it’s a more complex process. " 

"Finally, there is the Belgian model which is still more complex because Belgium itself is such a complex country: being a Turk in Brussels is not the same as being Turkish in Flanders or Wallonia because Brussels is a cosmopolitan city where the percentage of people of foreign origin is far higher than that of indigenous people, while in the other two regions (Flanders and Wallonia) those of foreign origin are a small minority compared with the dominant group. " 

 

"When faced with these models of integration, there are 3 types of response: the first is assimilation, where the migrant rejects all reference to Turkey, now regarded as a simple holiday destination; the second is complete rejection of integration, where the Turk settles in a ghetto (Schaerbeek in Brussels, Kreuzberg in Berlin or Strasbourg St. Denis for Paris); he refuses to learn the language of the host country and builds his identity around his original culture. The third is an intercultural strategy where he is influenced by, and himself influences the model – he becomes a bit Turkish and a bit German (Belgian or French) and refuses to build his identity around simple ethnicity because he is also young/old, Muslim/Christian, homosexual/heterosexual ... " 

 

Professor Kentel added that Turkish integration produces better results in Germany and Flanders because there is a recognition of otherness in these countries, whilst in France and in Wallonia, identity refers only to a republican notion of citizenship, a citizenship which doesn’t tolerate the construction of complex identities. 

 

 

Ich bin auch ein Berliner 

 

Another point in the Turkish professor’s discourse which I found interesting was that he explained how Turks identify more with a city in the host society than with the state because, "living in Berlin is not the same as living in Istanbul or Marrakesh. You can adapt your lifestyle more easily to the city in which you live because the city not only changes you, but you also change it.

In addition, the city is not just an architectural ensemble of streets and buildings –  the city also brings together people who use one or more languages to communicate between themselves. " 

 

Why is this identification with the city easier? "Because we live there and can sense directly our influence on the world around us. The nation is too large, it seems separate to us, but a city we can change, we can influence its evolution and in turn be influenced by the way it evolves. Of specific note for Turks is the impact of the Turkish state and society on attitudes: the considerable presence of the state in Turkey reveals a lack of confidence in the individual – migrants therefore try to build self-confidence by fighting for the recognition of their original culture." 

 

 

France between ideal and reality 

 

"It’s true, France doesn’t much like differences" replies Gaye Petek (from the Association ELELE and a former member of High Council for Integration). "But there are differences between the French ideal and French reality. " 

 

“When one speaks of Turks in France, one speaks of 450,000 people (Turks and French of Turkish origin.) One finds little evolution for the first generation – the groups living in the ghettos are targeted by radical islamists working like missionaries in order to recruit them, Turks have little neighbourly contact with the French, and the majority of marriages are ‘of convenience’, arranged or forced (83% marry a partner from the country of origin). It should be noted that 56% of the Turkish population is French by birth, but the path to success is more oriented towards economic and commercial success than to education. Economically, young Turks do better than young North Africans and this can sometimes create conflict between these two groups. " 

 

"Politically, 198 candidates of Turkish origin were present on electoral lists in the 2008 municipal elections of whom 91 got elected. Turks are less involved in policy debates than their North African counterparts; they are more concerned by what’s happening in Turkey. There is little participation in the voluntary sector and the Turkish community contains few artists or writers." 

 

 

Scientific objectivity or social harmony 

 

A secular personality within the voluntary sector, Gaye Petek’s speech upset a number of those present. Many considered that his speech was “ethnocentric.”  or “Franco-French” and that it gave an image of the Turkish community that was “too negative”. Personally, I was uncomfortable with this dismissal – the analysis delivered by this Franco-Turk was, after all, essentially sociological, numerical and descriptive in nature. 

 

Finally, it was Frank Baasner, the director of the Deutsch-Französisches Institut, who behind the scenes slipped me the key to understanding these differences in perception. “People’s roles influence the way they perceive the same words. You see things through the eyes of a journalist. Others, who are social workers, teachers, or businessmen, may perceive things differently.” 

 

That's when I realised that the level of criticism varies from one function to another because these people don’t work in the same way and they don’t have the same objectives. If the function of a journalist is to report the neutral discourse of the sociologist, the role of a facilitator or manager in a migrants’ association is generally to show things in a positive light, and to minimise the negatives, because his aim is to encourage successful community living and social peace. 

 

 

Alarming statistics 

 

But let’s get back to the Turkish community, because even in Germany the portrait of the Turkish community is far from ideal.

Professor Steffen Krohnert presented the results of his highly controversial study "indicators of integration in Germany". This includes comparisons between all the main ethnic groups (both migrant and non-migrant).

 

According to his figures, 4% of the German population is of Turkish origin and since 50% of this group were born in Germany, Turks are the most German of all foreign groups.

Despite this native anchorage, bicultural marriage (Turkish-German) accounts for only 5% of cases. Equally, approximately 20% of Turkish migrants have no educational qualification, their unemployment rate is 23% (28% for Turkish youngsters) and Turks are severely underrepresented in positions requiring high levels of confidence (firefighters, police, doctors).

 

A surprising result reported by the researcher was the fact that "young Turks born in Germany suffer more from unemployment than those who have immigrated to the country.” 

The study also highlights the difference between the integration of Turks living in service industry cities (Munich, Bonn, Frankfurt and Düsseldorf) and those living in traditional industrial cities (Dortmund, Nuremberg and Duisburg). In traditional industrial cities, where most sectors have been affected by the recession, Turks have lost their jobs, but such Turkish families have continued to live in these cities.

 

In his final speech, Krohnert concluded by explaining that his study did not examine the causes of such failures of integration, and here we come to understand why his work has created such controversy: raw data demonstrating such a clear failure can only too easily be used by populist political groups to provoke hatred of foreigners, and Turks in particular. 

Further work focussing on causes and solutions would perhaps enable policies to evolve in order to improve integration as measured by these indicators. I found this presentation particularly interesting because it demonstrates a tool that those working on integration policies currently lack: permanent numerical evaluation of the results of implemented policy. 

 

 

Integration through Money 

 

Money has no odour and businessmen in all three countries are already showing interest in patterns of integration via the labor market. When you know that Germany has 2.7 million people of Turkish origin (including 1.8 million Turkish citizens), 70,000 Turkish entrepreneurs of Turkish origin, employing 400,000 workers and generating a total yearly turnover of 40 billion with 8 billion euros of annual investment, it’s easier to understand their interest. 

"It is often stated that integration has failed in Germany. In reality, if we compare our indicators at international level we find that the integration of foreigners in Germany is in fact the least-poor, "  Professor Kolb stated. 

 

"If you take the coefficient of overrepresentation amongst the unemployed for all migrants, you get the figure of 1.5 for Germany (a foreigner living in Germany is 1.5 times more likely to be unemployed that a German), 1.9 for the United Kingdom, 2.9 for the Netherlands, 3.2 for Sweden and 4.4 for Belgium. How can we explain that theses figures are better in Germany? Because our country puts more emphasis on placement (employment agencies), continuous training, and the push for business-creation. " 

 

Much was made of the entrepreneurial nature of Turks but this does strike me as a bit of a cliché, especially when you take into account that the figures only go as far as business creation, and provide no information whatsoever on subsequent business failures.  

 

 

School failure 

 

Another workshop focused on schooling and extra-school learning, noting that Turks more often fail in school than their counterparts within the indigenous population or indeed those from other groups of foreign origin. In terms of equal opportunities of schooling, the German system was seen to be particularly inequitable due to a process whereby decisions about the child’s future academic orientation are taken too early on. Participants discussed at length possible methods of educational orientation and the role of those outside the school (parents and other external actors). 

 

After so much negative data on Turkish integration within these three countries, it’s clearly time we got together to develop tools for more effective integration of such people. Without action, the risk that we will be facing these same problems in 40 years’ time is obvious. 

 

(Translated by Nick Alexander. L'original en français)